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The Short-Changing of Investors 
WHY A SHORT SALE PRICE TEST RULE IS 
NECESSARY IN TODAY’S MARKETS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The credit crisis that began in the United States in 2007 
gripped the world financial system by September 2008, 
eventually leading to a global recession into 2009, and 
increased scrutiny of the governmental regulation of financial 
markets.1 In the United States, a particular focus was placed 
on the short selling of equity securities, especially the stocks of 
financial sector companies most affected by the credit crisis.2 
  
 1 In September 2008, the Inspector General of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) released a report blasting the agency for its lax oversight of Bear 
Stearns leading up to the collapse and subsequent sale of the investment bank to 
JPMorgan Chase in March 2008. Kara Scannell, The Financial Crisis: SEC Faulted for 
Missing Red Flags at Bear Stearns—Inspector General’s Scathing Report Says Agency 
Failed to Require the Investment Bank to Rein in Its Risk-Taking, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 
2008. The SEC issued an emergency ban on the short sale of hundreds of financial 
stocks and revised its orders three days later, prompting harsh criticism from 
numerous observers. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, The Financial Crisis: SEC Quickly 
Revises Short-Selling Rules—Shift on Financials, Hedge Funds Sends Traders 
Scrambling, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2008, at A9 (“There are a lot of us out there who are 
wondering what the SEC is thinking, whether they’ve gone off the rails here.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Charles Jones, Columbia Business School Finance 
Professor)). 
 2 See Kara Scannell, The Financial Crisis: SEC Issues Short Selling Rules in 
Bid to Stop Manipulation, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18. 2008, at A6. The credit crisis began in 
the late 1990’s as a result of a global increase in the availability in credit, spurred by 
investment in real estate. David Leonhardt, Can’t Grasp Credit Crisis? Join the Club, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2008, at A1. The United States housing market caught fire and 
many of these mortgages, and later other types of debt, were packaged into investment 
securities called collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) and sold to investors globally. 
Id. Some of these CDOs consisted of subprime mortgages that had higher interest rates 
because the loans were made to less creditworthy individuals. Id. Many investors, 
including banks and investment firms, who purchased these securities used high levels 
of leverage to invest in these CDOs. Id. When the U.S. housing market started to 
decline in early 2007, some of the subprime borrowers began to default on mortgage 
payments, which in turn meant that the CDOs purchased by investors also turned into 
bad investments because investors stopped receiving payments on the mortgages 
associated with CDOs. Id. The decrease in the value of the assets forced investors to 
write down the value of these assets, further increasing the investor’s leverage. As the 
financial system began to de-leverage, banks and other lenders were less willing to 
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Short selling is the “sale of a security which the seller does not 
own or any sale which is consummated by the delivery of a 
security borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller.”3 A short 
seller will then return the borrowed shares “by purchasing 
equivalent securities on the open market.”4 A short seller 
expects to profit by purchasing the replacement shares at a 
price lower than the price at which he sold the borrowed 
shares.5 The financial news media speculated as to whether 
short sellers participated in market manipulation that drove 
down stock prices and possibly accelerated the demise of 
several large and established financial corporations including 
American International Group and Lehman Brothers.6  
Following these accusations of manipulation, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the New 
York State Attorney General announced in September 2008 
that they would begin an inquiry into possible “short selling 
abuses.”7 At the height of the financial crisis, and in reaction to 
cascading stock prices as well as continued public scrutiny and 
speculation concerning market manipulation by short sellers, 
the SEC took unprecedented action and issued an emergency 
temporary ban on any short sales of the securities of 799 
financial companies.8  
  
extend credit to borrowers; investors providing capital began pulling money out 
because of a fear of being exposed to risky investments like CDOs. Id. The hesitance of 
banks and other lenders to extend credit to borrowers, even worthy ones, began to 
affect other areas of the economy. Id. The credit crisis and subsequent economic fallout 
are much more complicated than portrayed here. This simple summary is merely 
meant to illustrate why the stocks of financial institutions were particularly 
susceptible to short selling – the outlook for financial stocks in September 2008 was 
grim. 
 3 17 C.F.R § 242.200(a) (2007). 
 4  Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 59,748, 74 
Fed. Reg. 18,042, 18,044 (April 20, 2009) [hereinafter April 2009 Amendments to 
Regulation SHO]. 
 5 See id. 
 6 See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj & Jonathan D. Glater, A Bid to Curb Profit Gambit as 
Banks Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at A1; Posting of Evan Newmark to Deal 
Journal, http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/09/19/mean-street-a-wall-street-conspiracy-of-
course/ (Sept. 19, 2008, 10:35 EST). 
 7 Bajaj & Glater, supra note 6. New York State Attorney General Andrew 
Cuomo compared short sellers to “looters after a hurricane.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 8 Press Release 2008-211, SEC, SEC Halts Short Selling of Financial Stocks 
to Protect Investors and Markets (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/ 
2008-211.htm. The SEC put this ban into place for ten trading days to “prevent short 
selling from being used to drive down the share prices of issuers even where there is no 
fundamental basis for a price decline other than general market conditions.” 
Emergency Order Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, 
Exchange Act Release No. 58,592, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,169, 55,170 (proposed Sept. 18, 
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This extreme action banning short sales of certain 
securities was notable because it was a striking divergence 
from the actions the SEC took just a year earlier, when, in July 
2007, it repealed the long-standing Rule 10a-1 under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.9 Enacted in 1938 and 
commonly known as the “uptick rule,”10 Rule 10a-1 was 
intended “to restrict short selling in a declining market.”11 The 
rule prohibited short selling a stock at a price less than the 
price of the “immediately preceding” sale of that stock.12 The 
SEC rescinded Rule 10a-1 in 2007 to “modernize and simplify 
short sale regulation,” judging the rule “no longer . . . effective 
or necessary.”13 The SEC’s repeal of the uptick rule was, 
therefore, a complete repudiation of its longstanding judgment 
that unrestricted short selling could be dangerous in a falling 
stock market. 
The stated mission of the modern-day SEC is to “protect 
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and 
  
2008) [hereinafter Sept. 2008 Emergency Order]. The SEC’s ban on short sales of 
financial stocks followed a similar ban issued in the United Kingdom by the Financial 
Services Authority and supported by that nation’s Treasury Chief. Kara Scannell et al., 
SEC Is Set to Issue Temporary Ban Against Short Selling, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2008, 
at A1. The short selling ban was eventually extended to the stocks of almost 1000 
companies. Kara Scannell & Serena Ng, SEC’s Ban on Short Selling Is Casting a Very 
Wide Net, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at C1. Because the standards for inclusion on 
the ban list were so broad, it included surprising names, such as CVS Caremark, the 
pharmacy company and IBM, the technology company. Id. The short sell ban ended up 
spanning a total of fourteen (14) trading days, from September 19 through October 8, 
2008. Kara Scannell & Craig Karmin, Crisis on Wall Street: Short-Sale Ban Ends to 
Poor Reviews, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2008, at C3.  
 9 Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1 Final Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 
55,970, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,348, 36,348 (July 3, 2007) [hereinafter Regulation SHO and 
Rule 10a-1 Final Rule Release]. In addition to eliminating Rule 10a-1, the Commission 
also prohibited any self-regulatory organization (SRO) from promulgating its own price 
test. Id. An SRO is a non-government entity that may implement regulations to protect 
investors, such as a stock exchange. Investopedia, Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO), 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sro.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). Because the 
SEC repealed Rule 10a-1, it also repealed Rule 200(g), which required marking 
securities sales transactions exempted from Rule 10a-1 as “short exempt.” Regulation 
SHO and Rule 10a-1 Final Rule Release, at 36,348.  
 10 Scannell et al., SEC Is Set to Issue Temporary Ban Against Short Selling, 
supra note 8. 
 11 Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1 Final Rule Release, supra note 9, at 
36,348. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. Despite the fact the SEC loosened some restrictions on short selling by 
repealing the uptick rule, Regulation SHO tightened restrictions on naked short 
selling. Id. 
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facilitate capital formation.”14 The Commission was formed in 
193415 after the devastating effects of the stock market crash of 
1929, and almost immediately, it examined the role of short 
selling in securities markets and recommended regulation of 
the practice.16 In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, 
the SEC again reconsidered its regulation of short selling and 
whether the uptick rule or some other short sale price test is 
necessary to protect investors and preserve orderly financial 
markets.17 In April 2009, the SEC solicited public comments to 
reconsider whether the uptick rule was necessary and if such a 
rule “would help promote market stability and restore investor 
confidence.”18 The SEC also sought comment on whether a 
modified version of the uptick rule would be more appropriate.19 
The SEC announced an additional public comment period to 
address “alternative approaches” to the uptick rule in August 
2009.20 Finally in February 2010, the SEC implemented Rule 
201, a modified version of the original uptick rule.21 This 
version of the rule, which became effective in May 2010, will 
only be triggered “if the price of an individual security declines 
intra-day by [ten percent] or more from the prior day’s closing 
price for that security.”22 Once this ten percent decline occurs, 
  
 14 SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains 
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwe 
do.shtml (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).  
 15 The SEC was established as a result of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006). The Securities and Exchange Act is codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78. 
 16 SEC, FIRST ANN. REP. OF THE SEC 16 (1935), http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
annual_report/1935.pdf. [hereinafter FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SEC] (“A detailed 
analysis of the subject of short selling was made for the purpose of determining the 
extent to which such selling is economically justified and the extent to which it should 
be curbed.”). At this time, the Commission also recommended to the exchanges that it 
should implement a version of the uptick rule, believing such a rule would “preserve 
those features of short selling which are in the public interest.” Id. (emphasis added).  
 17 When SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro was nominated by President 
Barack Obama in January 2009, she cited re-examination of the uptick rule by the SEC 
as part of her agenda during her confirmation hearing with the Senate Banking 
Committee. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Nominee Offers Plan for Tighter Regulation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at B3. 
 18 Press Release 2009-76, SEC, SEC Seeks Comments on Short Sale Price 
Test and Circuit Breaker Restrictions (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 
2009/2009-76.htm. 
 19 Id.  
 20 Press Release 2009-185, SEC, SEC Seeks Comment on Alternative Uptick 
Rule (Aug. 17, 2009), http://sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-185.htm. 
 21 Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 61,595, 75 
Fed. Reg. 11,232, 11,233-34 (March 10, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Amendments to 
Regulation SHO]. 
 22  Id. at 11,234. 
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short sellers may not sell a security “at or below the current 
national best bid” for the “remainder of the day and the 
following day.”23 
The adoption of this alternative, compromise rule 
reflects both the SEC’s acknowledgment of the need for some 
regulation of short selling, and the tentativeness with which 
the Commission has proceeded in this area, having changed its 
position three times in just three years. Without attempting to 
assess the pros and cons of the new rule, this Note argues more 
generally that regulation of short selling—a feature of our 
regulatory regime for over seventy years—is necessary to 
ensure orderly markets and investor confidence. While the 
adoption of Rule 201 is undoubtedly a positive step, a look at 
the convoluted history of the rise and fall of the uptick rule 
reveals a deeper concern over existing justifications for the rule 
and what degree of short selling regulation is sufficient and 
appropriate. 
This Note will discuss the practice and history of short 
selling and the uptick rule, including the reasons why the SEC 
repealed the rule in 2007, whether its removal was in line with 
the SEC’s mission, and why the rule is necessary to maintain 
orderly markets. Part II describes the mechanics of short 
selling equity stocks, the reasons for short selling and why 
some have a negative view of the practice, and surveys the 
history surrounding the implementation of the uptick rule in 
1938. Part III examines the reasons why the SEC felt the 
uptick rule was no longer necessary for effective market 
regulation and the environment in which the SEC made this 
decision. Part IV discusses alternative statutory provisions the 
SEC could use to regulate short selling in the absence of the 
uptick rule. Finally, Part V argues why the reinstatement of 
the uptick rule or other price test on short selling as a backstop 
method of protecting investors is necessary because of the 
difficulty of proving fraudulent or collusive price manipulation 
through short selling. It also examines the different versions of 
price tests evaluated by SEC and the new alternative uptick 
rule that took effect in May 2010. Finally, this Part posits that 
the uptick rule can be used as a tool to preserve investor 
confidence and maintain order in troubled, declining markets, 
preventing both panic and any repeat of the type of radical 
  
 23 Id. The best bid is “[t]he highest quoted bid for a particular stock among all 
those offered.” Investopedia, Best Bid, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/ 
bestbid.asp (last visited Apr. 25, 2010). 
1452 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:4 
measures taken by the SEC in September 2008, when it 
banned all short sales of financial stocks. 
II. THE MECHANICS AND HISTORY OF SHORT SELLING AND 
THE UPTICK RULE 
Concerns and skepticism about the effects of short 
selling of securities have led to regulation of the practice 
around the world for hundreds of years.24 In 1922, J. Edward 
Meeker, an economist for the New York Stock Exchange, 
observed that although “prejudice against short selling of 
securities is not new,” the practice of short selling has “stood 
that hardest of all tests—the test of time.”25  
A.  The “Mysterious”26 Practice of Short Selling: How It 
Works 
A short sale is, in simplest terms, a bet that the price of 
a particular stock will fall.27 Investors initiate a short sale by 
borrowing an amount of stock and selling it in anticipation that 
they will be able to repurchase the same stock later, but at a 
lower price.28 The borrower/investor (or his broker) later 
repurchases the stock at the lower price, returns it to the 
lender, and profits from the difference between the sale and 
repurchase price.29 The borrower also pays the lender a fee for 
  
 24 J. EDWARD MEEKER, THE WORK OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 96-97 (1922), 
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=KDBIAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover& 
dq=The+work+of+the+stock+exchange. The practice of short selling was prohibited in 
England in 1733, only to be reinstated in 1858. Id. France, the state of New York, and 
Germany have also passed and later repealed legislation forbidding the practice. Id. 
After Germany instituted a rule banning short sales on the Berlin Stock Exchange in 
1896, at least one economist blamed the rule for an outflow of capital to other 
international markets leading to depressed markets in Berlin. Id. at 97. 
 25 Id. at 96. 
 26 Id. at 97. Because short selling is a somewhat sophisticated investment 
strategy that is not well known to the general public, short selling has also been 
described as an activity “cloaked in secrecy.” Gary Weiss, The Long and Short of Short-
Selling, BUS. WK., June 10, 1991, at 106.  
 27 Jonathan R. Macey et al., Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of the 
Uptick Rule and Its Role in the View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 799, 799-800 (1989). While different types of assets can be sold short, 
this Note will focus on the short sale of equity securities. 
 28 Id. at 799; see also David Chung, Making Sense Out of Market Sentiment 
Indicators, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, June 16, 1999, at A3; Weiss, supra note 26. 
 29 Macey et al., supra note 27, at 799-800. In the wake of the financial crisis 
of 2008, there also was much discussion by business and media commentators about 
the impact on financial markets of so-called naked short sales. A naked short sale 
operates similarly to the short sale described here; the major difference is that in a 
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the use of the stock in the transaction. Although there is no 
central, public marketplace for borrowing shares for short 
selling, short selling of stocks with a large market 
capitalization is not difficult, since these stocks are widely held 
and have high levels of institutional ownership.30 It is not as 
simple or inexpensive to borrow stocks that have a smaller 
market capitalization, are closely held, or are believed to be 
overvalued, since these stocks are highly sought for 
borrowing.31  
One important distinction between a short sale and a 
regular purchase of stock—when an investor purchases a stock 
in anticipation that its value will rise—is the “theoretically 
unlimited” risk of loss when an investor sells short.32 If an 
investor made a run-of-the-mill stock purchase to hold it for the 
long term (a “long” position), and the stock price later fell to 
zero, he would not lose any more than the amount he paid for 
that stock. But if the investor short sells a security (a “short” 
position) and the market price of that stock keeps rising, he 
continues to lose money because he is still required to replace 
the borrowed stock, and this purchase will now have to be 
made at a progressively higher price.33 When a stock with a 
limited supply is in high demand by the market, forcing prices 
  
naked short sale, an investor sells a stock without actually having borrowed it. When 
the seller fails to deliver the stock to the purchaser, the stock has been diluted and the 
transaction fails. Investopedia, Naked Shorting, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
n/nakedshorting.asp (last visited Oct.6, 2009). In July 2008, the SEC banned the naked 
short sale of 19 financial stocks in reaction to the threatening credit crisis. Emergency 
Order Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Exchange Act 
Release No. 58,166, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,379, 42,379-80 (proposed July 15, 2008) 
[hereinafter July 2008 Emergency Order]. When the SEC banned short sales on 
financial stocks in September 2008, it also passed emergency measures restricting 
naked short sales. Sept. 2008 Emergency Order, supra note 6, at 55,169-70. The SEC 
made these emergency measures permanent in July 2009. Amendments to Regulation 
SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 60,388, 74 Fed. Reg. 38,266, 38,266 (July, 31, 2009) 
[hereinafter July 2009 Final Rule Release — Rule 204]. This footnote serves for 
purposes of clarification only. Naked short selling is highly controversial, and as such, 
this Note will only address the uptick rule as it relates to standard short sales and the 
role of the rule in the market and in protecting investors. 
 30 The Long and Short of Hedge Funds: Effects of Strategies for Managing 
Market Risks: Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises 2 (2003), available at http://financialservices.house. 
gov/media/pdf/052203ol.pdf. (testimony of Owen A. Lamont, Graduate School of 
Business, University of Chicago and NBER) [hereinafter Owen A. Lamont].  
 31 Id. at 8. 
 32 Michael R. Powers et al., Market Bubbles and Wasteful Avoidance: Tax and 
Regulatory Constraints on Short Sales, 57 TAX L. REV. 223, 246-47 & n.49 (2004). 
 33 Susan Lee, The Dismal Science: Short-Sellers Keep the Market Honest, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2002, at A18. 
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up, a “short squeeze” may occur.34 Thus, when short sellers rush 
to exit their positions, prices continue to increase, and losses to 
short sellers continue to mount.35 In addition to the risk of 
unlimited financial loss, if an investor is holding a short 
position and dividends are declared on his borrowed stock, he 
will be responsible for reimbursing the lender for the total 
amount of the dividends.36  
1. Reasons for the Negative Perception of Short Selling 
Many observers see short selling as a “bet[] against the 
team,”37 anti-economic growth,38 or “un-American” since short 
sellers profit when they correctly bet that a stock’s price will 
fall.39 Consequently, in times of economic trouble and difficult 
world events, “shorts” are often looked upon as scapegoats, 
  
 34 Investopedia, Short Squeeze, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/short 
squeeze.asp (last visited October 29, 2008). 
 35 A recent example of a short squeeze occurred in October 2008 when 
Volkswagen AG stock rose 348% in two days after Porsche announced it would take a 
75% stake in VW, rather than the 50% share investors had anticipated based on 
comments by Porsche executives the previous month. Gregory Zuckerman et al. VW’s 
348% Two-Day Gain is Pain for Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J, Oct. 29, 2008, at C1. This 
surge in VW’s share price resulted in the company having the largest market 
capitalization of any public traded firm in the world at one point during the trading 
day on October 28, 2008. Alexis Xydias, Porsche Gains, Volkswagen Drops on VW Stock 
Supply, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601087&sid=ai_m6Q0oIJ_U&refer=home. Many hedge fund investors around the 
world had short positions in VW stock because they considered the stock to be 
overvalued. Zuckerman, et al., supra. After the squeeze occurred, investors, who 
incurred billions in losses, accused Porsche of misleading them about its plans for 
investment in VW and called for an investigation into the matter by the German 
securities regulator and for more disclosure requirements in German markets. Id. 
Porsche owned options to purchase up to 31.5% of VW common stock; the public outcry 
accusing the company of market manipulation forced it to announce that it would settle 
up to 5% of its options in an attempt to increase liquidity of VW stock. Xydias, supra.  
 36 SEC, Short Sales, http://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2009). 
 37 See Macey et al., supra note 27, at 800 (quoting SEC Commissioner Joseph 
Grundfest). 
 38 See Robert D. Hershey Jr., Investing; Betting That a Stock Will Drop, N.Y. 
TIMES, December 7, 1986, at Sec. 3, p. 16. A bet against a stock through a short sale 
could create a conflict of interest if an individual sells a stock short but is also a 
shareholder and officer, director, or other employee of that company. To avoid such 
conflict, the SEC restricts shorts sales by corporate officers. Kevin A. Crisp, Giving 
Investors Short Shrift: How Short Sale Constraints Decrease Market Efficiency and a 
Modest Proposal for Letting More Shorts Go Naked, 8 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 135, 142 (2008). 
If a corporate officer or director does not own any shares in his or her company, short 
selling is prohibited, but if the officer does own shares, he may not hold any short 
position for more than twenty (20) days. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2006).  
 39 Lamont, supra note 30, at 6. 
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particularly in the wake of large stock market declines.40 
During World War I, the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) 
imposed special restrictions on short sales because of fear that 
the Germans would use the practice to manipulate and drive 
down stock prices,41 and because it would harm the morale of 
the market.42 In the years following the stock market crash of 
1929, when Congress began developing the extensive 
regulations of securities markets that are in place today, there 
was even a proposal to ban short selling altogether.43 Congress 
and others again called for increased scrutiny of short sales of 
equity stocks after the precipitous stock market decline in 
1987.44 Additionally, after the terrorist attacks in New York 
and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001, U.S. and 
European market regulators even investigated a spike in short 
sales of airline and insurance stocks in the days leading up to 
the attacks to determine if short sellers knew about the plan.45  
In addition to being criticized for profiting from falling 
stock prices, another reason for the vilification of short sellers 
is the fear that they aim to benefit from market manipulation.46 
In a “bear raid,” investors continually short sell an equity stock 
in an attempt to influence “less informed” shareholders of a 
negative price outlook on the security, in the hopes they will 
sell off their shares.47 This is problematic because the rapid 
decline of a stock price caused by market manipulation could 
prompt margin calls or liquidations.48 Many investors trade on 
the margin, meaning that they trade with borrowed money 
  
 40 Nasty, Brutish and Short; Short-Selling, ECONOMIST, June 21, 2008, at 46; 
see also Lamont, supra note 30, at 7. 
 41 Id. at 8. 
 42 Macey et al., supra note 27, at 801. 
 43 Id. at 799. Representative Adolph Sabath of Illinois called short sales “the 
greatest evil that has been permitted or sanctioned by the Government that I know of.” 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 44 Id. at 799. 
 45 Cassell Bryan-Low, Initial Investigation Fails to Dig Up Evidence Linking 
Level of Short Selling to Terrorists, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2001, at C2. The SEC 
investigated thirty-eight firms whose stock was identified as having unusual trading 
activity in the days before the terrorist attacks, but no connection was affirmed. 
Susanne Craig, SEC Examines Trading in Firms Before Sept. 11, WALL ST. J, Oct. 3. 
2001, at C1.  
 46 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act 
Release 54,891, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,068, 75,070 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Proposed 
Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1]. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id.; see also Rob Curran & Geoffrey Rogow, Margin Calls, Redemptions 
Weigh on Market, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Oct. 28, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB122513281830072753.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.  
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while keeping a certain level of cash with brokers as 
collateral.49 Brokers and exchanges determine the level of cash 
necessary, based on risk.50 Generally, declining stock prices and 
increasing market volatility increase the risk of loss, prompting 
brokerages to ask for more collateral. This demand is known as 
a margin call.51 Often, to raise cash for margin calls, investors 
sell stock which can depress prices and create a cycle which 
results in another margin call.52 In addition, when investors 
continue to sell stocks to raise cash for margin calls, they are 
less likely to buy stocks, further depressing market prices.53  
The 2008 credit crisis illustrated this fear of short 
sellers manipulating the market when, once again, regulators 
singled out the shorts for contributing to financial chaos.54 After 
the failure of Bear Stearns in March 2008 there were 
accusations that short sellers spread rumors about companies 
to put downward pressure on stock prices, thus allowing 
investors with a short position to reap profits.55 These 
accusations eventually led the SEC to issue an emergency 
order in July 2008 announcing that it was going to begin 
investigating whether short sellers were colluding to 
manipulate the markets for their own gain.56  
The subsequent failure of Lehman Brothers and 
concerns about market volatility led the Commission to issue a 
total ban on the short sale of financial stocks a few months 
later.57 In September 2008, by installing a ban on the short sale 
  
 49 Investopedia, Margin, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/margin.asp 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2008). 
 50 Curran & Rogow, supra note 48. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Jenny Anderson, A New Wave of Vilifying Short Sellers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
30, 2008, at C1. During a Senate hearing probing the failure of Bear Stearns, Senator 
Christopher Dodd suggested that there was collusion in the marketplace targeting the 
bank. Id. 
 55 Id.  
 56 See July 2008 Emergency Order, supra note 29, at 42,379. 
 57 Press Release 2008-211, supra note 8. The Chicago Board of Exchange 
Volatility Index (VIX) “is a key measure of market expectations of near-term volatility 
conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices.” Chicago Board of Exchange—Micro 
Site, Introduction to VIX Futures and Options, http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/ 
introduction.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). The VIX is considered a barometer of 
investor sentiment (it is often called the “fear index”) and uses options prices to 
estimate the range of movement of the S&P 500 for the following 30 days. Tom 
Lauricella & Aaron Lucchetti, Dow Slides Again, Down 514.45—S&P at a 5-Year Low; 
What’s Behind the Surge in the VIX ‘Fear’ Index?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2008. After 
Lehman declared bankruptcy on September 16, 2008, the VIX Index rose above 30 for 
 
2010] THE SHORT-CHANGING OF INVESTORS 1457 
of financial stocks, the SEC sought to avert a “crisis of 
confidence” resulting from sharp declines in stock prices.58 The 
Commission posited that a drop in stock prices would 
potentially affect the “liquidity” and “ultimate viability” of 
financial institutions and damage the broader securities 
market.59 Though it soon became apparent that this ban was 
temporary,60 it provoked much negative reaction in the 
financial community.61 Regulators in other nations soon 
followed suit, hoping to prevent the volatile equities markets 
from spiraling further out of control.62  
Legislators are not the only ones who have criticized the 
practice of short selling. Companies have also taken actions 
against short sellers in a number of ways, including issuing 
stock with certain restrictions that make short selling 
impossible, taking legal action against short sellers, and 
reporting short sellers to regulatory agencies.63 At the same 
  
the first time since 2007, which was when the first news of a coming subprime crisis hit 
the markets. The VIX remained above 30, hitting a high of 81 in October 2008. For 
comparison, the VIX rose above 30 on only three trading days in 2007 (and went no 
higher than 31.09). VIX Daily Closing Prices 2004-Present, Chicago Board of 
Exchange, http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/historical.aspx (click on link to VIX data for 
2004 to present) (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). The previous high for the VIX was 52.05 on 
September 21, 2001, when fear was high following the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks. Lauricella & Lucchetti, supra. 
 58 Sept. 2008 Emergency Order, supra note 8, at 55, 175. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See Scannell & Karmin, supra note 8. 
 61 See Jonathan Macey, The Government is Contributing to the Panic, WALL 
ST. J, Oct. 11, 2008, at A15; Scannell & Karmin, supra note 8; Menachem Brenner & 
Marti G. Subrahmanyam, End the Ban on Short-Selling, FORBES.COM, Oct. 1, 2008, 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/30/short-selling-ban-oped-cx_mb_1001brenner.html; 
Post of David Gaffen to Market Beat, http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2008/09/19/five-
reasons-why-the-short-selling-ban-stinks/?mod=rss_WSJBlog?mod=marketbeat (Sept. 
19, 2008, 13:03 EST). 
 62 See Kara Scannell, Short Sale Ban Spreads Around Globe, Sept. 22, 2008, 
at C3 (detailing implementation of short sale ban by Australia, the Netherlands and 
Taiwan.). 
 63 Lamont, supra note 30, at 3. In a 2003 study, Professor Lamont examined 
the long-term returns of 270 firms that attempted to actively discourage short selling 
through threats, legal action or accusations of improper activity. Id. at 4-5. In the year 
following these firms’ actions against short sellers, they had an average return 
compared to the overall stock market of -24%. Id. at 3. This indicates that the short 
sellers were correct and that the securities of the firms in question were overpriced. Id. 
An example of a company issuing securities creatively to prevent short selling occurred 
in 2006 when Pegasus Wireless granted a dividend to stockholders for every 10 shares 
held; the dividend was distributed as a stock warrant, but the company refused to issue 
the warrant unless investors held their shares in their own name. Jenny Anderson, A 
Bet Against Those Who Bet Against the Company, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2006, at C7. 
Brokers often hold shares in their accounts (and in the broker’s name) for clients and 
then lend the shares held to short sellers. Id. This dividend structure was problematic 
because it forced brokers to recall the stock to prove shareholders’ identities, which put 
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time that the SEC announced the temporary ban on short 
selling of financial stocks in 2008, it also enacted a rule that 
required hedge funds and other institutional investors to 
disclose which companies’ securities they were holding short.64 
This provoked an immediate backlash from the investment 
community over concerns that company executives would no 
longer provide information to investors who were known to be 
shorting their company’s stock.65 The SEC eventually backed 
down from this rule over the investors’ concerns.66 
2. The Positive Effect of Short Selling on the Markets 
Despite the persistent animosity toward shorts during 
troubled economic times, short sales of securities do have 
several positive effects on stock markets. Two of the most 
important areas of the market that are positively affected by 
short selling are “pricing efficiency” and “liquidity.”67 If stock 
markets were perfectly efficient, short sales would not be 
necessary because all stocks would be correctly valued.68 
However, since markets are in fact imperfect, short sales can 
help correct inefficiencies created by “asymmetric information, 
taxes, or other imperfections” by moving prices closer to 
equilibrium.69 This is because a short sale is an investor’s way 
of “inform[ing] the market of [his negative] evaluation of future 
  
a short squeeze on the stock. Id. The CEO of Pegasus claimed that these actions were 
taken not to harm short sellers but because the company was concerned that phantom 
(fake) shares of its stock were being traded. Id. Nonetheless, the company’s share price 
rose 30% after the warrant plan was announced. Id. 
 64 See Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(K)(2), Short Sale Disclosure, 
Exchange Act Release No. 58,592, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,169, 55,170 (Sept. 18, 2008). 
 65 One prominent investor, Jim Chanos, called the SEC’s rule “akin to the 
government suddenly requiring Coca-Cola to disclose their secret formula for free to all 
their competitors.” Beth Healy & Ross Kerber, Short-sellers Cry Foul After Ban, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 26, 2008, (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 66 See Disclosure of Short Sales and Short Positions by Institutional 
Investment Managers, Exchange Act Release No. 58,785, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,678, 61,679 
(Oct. 17, 2008). The SEC still required investment funds to disclose short positions, but 
decided to make this information nonpublic; the requirement ended on Oct. 19, 2008. 
Id. 
 67 2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra 
note 46, at 75,069. 
 68 The efficient market theory posits that in an efficient market, all investors 
would have perfect information, thus investments would be properly valued and as a 
result, short selling would be unnecessary. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE 
FINANCE 15 (6th ed. 2008). 
 69 See Powers et al., supra note 32, at 235-36. 
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stock price performance.”70 Many feel that short sellers keep 
exuberance in check and help to quiet “noise traders.”71 
Moreover, short sellers provide liquidity because not only must 
shorts cover their sales by buying stocks,72 but an investor may 
also be more willing to take a bigger risk on a long position if 
he can hedge himself with a short position.73 In 1931, Richard 
Whitney, then-President of the NYSE, testified before Congress 
that he believed the exchange would have been forced to close 
after the 1929 stock market crash if it were not for the 
willingness of short sellers, the only investors that made money 
when the NYSE crashed, to put their money back into the 
depressed market after stock prices dropped.74  
The perceived skepticism or pessimism of short sellers 
plays a very important role in the market. Short sellers are 
often among the first to detect corporate fraud and were among 
the first to issue warnings about ill-fated companies such as 
Enron and Tyco.75 Since many short sellers are among the most 
informed and sophisticated investors, they may perceive 
financial malfeasance before market regulators, despite the 
best attempts of the SEC and other regulatory agencies to keep 
tabs on companies. Individual investors that research the 
fundamentals of a company and its stock, operating only with 
an eye for profit, may simply have more resources and perhaps 
more motivation to delve into the details of a firm’s financial 
information when making an investment decision.76 
  
 70 2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra 
note 46, at 75,070. 
 71 Crisp, supra note 38, at 142. Noise traders act “for reasons generally 
unrelated to an accurate measure of an asset’s fundamental value. . . . [and] might act 
on market momentum, misinformation or poor strategy.” Id. at 141 (citation omitted). 
An overly positive view on a stock is less likely to be challenged than a view that is 
excessively negative. See Powers et al., supra note 32, at 241. 
 72 2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra 
note 46, at 75,069. 
 73 See Macey et al., supra note 27, at 800. 
 74 Id. at 801-02.  
 75 See Anderson, supra note 54. Jim Chanos, who runs one of the largest 
short funds in the world for Kynikos Associates, calls short sellers “financial 
detectives.” Nasty, Brutish and Short, supra note 40, at 46 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Coincidentally, Mr. Chanos is also credited for being one of the first skeptics 
of Enron’s financial statements. Id. 
 76 See Richard Sauer, Bring on the Bears, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at A25 
(“By putting their money where their mouths are, short sellers are the only market 
participants with an incentive to deflate bubbles and inject pessimistic information into 
the market.”). 
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B. The History of the Uptick Rule—1938-2007 
Considering the historic sentiment against short selling, 
it is not surprising that following the 1929 market crash, short 
selling was a concern to legislators.77 However, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) did not specifically 
govern short sales; it instead delegated regulation of short 
selling to the SEC.78 In 1934, the newly-created SEC released a 
list of rule recommendations for adoption by national 
exchanges.79 One of the sixteen rules recommended was to 
prohibit the short sale of a security at a price below the last 
previous sale price of that security.80 The SEC believed this 
formulation of the short selling rule would prevent abusive 
short selling on exchanges while also “preserv[ing] those 
features of short selling which are in the public interest.”81 
Thus, the rule would protect the investing public while 
enabling markets to operate unhindered, allowing them to reap 
the inherent benefits of short selling.  
After a decline in the market in the fall of 1937, the 
SEC undertook a study to examine whether short selling 
exacerbated the drop in stock prices.82 Though several studies of 
short selling were still under way at the time, the SEC released 
some data publicly in January 1938 that suggested that short 
selling increased in a declining market and that in such a 
  
 77 Macey et al., supra note 27, at 801-03. 
 78 Id. at 802-03. Regulatory power over short selling is codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j (a)(1) (2006). This provision states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange – (a) (1) To effect a short sale, or 
to use or employ any stop-loss order in connection with the purchase or sale, 
of any security registered on a national securities exchange, in contravention 
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
Id. 
 79 See FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SEC, supra note 16, at 40-44. 
 80 OFF. OF ECON. ANALYSIS, SEC, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE SHORT SALE 
PRICE RESTRICTIONS UNDER REGULATION SHO PILOT 12 (2007), http://www.sec. 
gov/news/studies/2007/regshopilot020607.pdf [hereinafter OEA ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]. 
The SEC recommended as its Sixteenth Rule governing exchanges that “[n]o member 
shall use any facility of the exchange to effect on the exchange a short sale of any 
security in the unit of trading at a price below the last sale price of such security on the 
exchange,” but the rule was not implemented at that time. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE SEC, supra note 13, at 44. 
 81 FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SEC, supra note 16, at 16.  
 82 Exchange Act Release No. 1548, 1938 WL 32911, *1 (Jan. 24, 1938). 
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market, “short sales are seriously destructive of stability.”83 It 
was based on this limited information that the SEC concluded 
that short selling needed to be further regulated, and it 
adopted a set of rules, effective February 8, 1938, which 
attempted to “prohibit short selling in a declining market.”84 
These rules included the uptick rule,85 previously recommended 
for adoption by the exchanges, as well as a rule that all sell 
orders be marked “short” or “long.”86 It is notable that when the 
SEC implemented this rule change, it made clear that it 
wished to formulate the short selling rules in such a way as to 
“avoid placing undue burden or inconvenience on transactions,” 
and that it would revisit the necessity of these rules if they 
were deemed unnecessary by the Commission’s ongoing studies 
or if they had a negative impact on the market.87 
The 1938 version of the uptick rule went virtually 
unchanged until the SEC removed all price test rules for short 
sales in July 2007.88 In 1939, the SEC modified the rule slightly 
to allow short selling on a zero uptick, making a short sale 
permissible if the sale occurred at the same price as the last 
trade, if the price of the next-to-last trade was an uptick.89 The 
  
 83 Id. at *5. 
 84 Id. at *1. 
 85 Id. at *2 (Rule X-10A- 1(a)). A tick refers to a move upward or downward in 
the price of a security.  
 86 Id. (Rule X-10A-1(b)). 
 87 Id. at *1. The 1937 study has been criticized as inadequate due to its 
limited scope and the short time frame for which it was performed. Short Sales of 
Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 13,091, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,530, 56,533 (Dec. 28, 
1976). In addition, after the tick rule was implemented, no further data compiled from 
the 1937 study was publicly released despite being promised in the initial report. Id. 
 88 The “downtick” and “uptick” distinction is a matter of semantics. The early 
(downtick) version of the rule prevented a short sale when the last price movement was 
downward, while the later (uptick) version of the rule prohibits a short sale at a price 
that is not at a tick price higher than the last previous trade. See Exchange Act Release 
No. 1548, 1938 WL 32911, supra note 82, at *1 (“No person shall . . . effect a short sale 
of any security at or below the price at which the last sale thereof, regular way, was 
effected on such exchange.”).  
 89 An illustration of the zero plus tick test and compliance with Rule 10a-1 in 
a sale sequence follows: 
Last sale: 47 
Next sale: 47.04 — Plus tick compared to last trade; short sale permitted 
Next sale: 47.04 — Zero-plus tick compared to next-to-last trade; short sale 
permitted 
Next Sale: 47.00 — Minus tick compared to next-to-last trade; no short sale 
permitted 
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SEC felt that this rule met three important objectives: (1) it did 
not unfairly restrict short sales when the market was 
increasing; (2) it prevented bear raiders from driving down 
prices in a declining market; and (3) it prevented short sellers 
from using all bids at one price level, thereby causing long 
sellers to set progressively lower prices.90 The uptick rule 
applied to all securities registered on national securities 
exchanges and also regulated trades of securities “admitted to 
unlisted trading privileges”91 on national securities exchanges, 
if the trades were reported in accordance with an “effective 
transaction reporting plan.”92 However, the uptick rule did not 
apply to over-the-counter bulletin board securities or pink 
sheets, as neither of these types of securities are traded on a 
national exchange.93  
The short sale price test rule operated slightly 
differently as applied to securities trading on the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Global Market (NASDAQ).94 
Before becoming a national securities exchange, the NASDAQ 
operated a price test for short selling called a bid test.95 The bid 
test did not allow short sales at or below the current highest 
bid when that bid was less than the previous highest bid.96 
When the NASDAQ applied to the SEC to become a national 
exchange in January 2006, it requested, and received, an 
  
Next Sale: 47.00 — Zero-minus tick compared to next to last trade; no short 
sale permitted 
2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra note 46, at 
75,070. 
 90 See id. (citation omitted); Macey et al., supra note 27, at 803-04 (citation 
omitted).  
 91 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1(a)(1)(i) (2007). 
 92 Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Effective transaction reporting plan 
means any transaction reporting plan approved by the Commission pursuant to 
§ 242.601.” 17 C.F.R § 242.600(b)(22). Section 242.601 describes minimum reporting 
requirements for securities transactions. See 17 C.F.R § 242.601 (2007). 
 93 2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra 
note 46, at 75,070. Over-the-counter bulletin board securities (OTCBB) are generally 
small, risky, and traded infrequently. Investopedia, Over-The-Counter Bulletin Board 
(OTCBB), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/otcbb.asp (last visited November 5, 
2008). There are no listing requirements to trade on the OTCBB, though companies 
must file financial statements with the SEC. Id. Pink sheets are securities that are not 
traded on an exchange, do not have listing requirements and are not required to file 
with the SEC. Investopedia, Pink Sheets, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pink 
sheets.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).  
 94 2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra 
note 46, at 75,070-71. 
 95 Id. The SEC granted temporary approval in 1994 for the NASD to use this 
bid test (former NASD Rule 3350). Id. 
 96 Id. at 75,071 & n.29. 
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exemption from the uptick rule.97 The bid test remained in 
place until the repeal of all short sale price tests in 2007.98 
Though the NASDAQ-listed securities were technically exempt 
from the uptick rule, these securities were still regulated by a 
price test. 
To enforce the uptick rule the SEC used a marking 
requirement. When stock trades were executed, each order 
placed with a broker-dealer had to be marked as “short” or 
“long.”99 As such, if an investor mismarked a trade as a 
purchase of shares for a long position, but actually purchased a 
short position, and did not observe the price test requirement of 
the uptick rule, the investor would be found in violation of Rule 
10a-1. For example, the SEC brought an enforcement action 
against Sandell Asset Management after the firm began short 
selling shares of Hibernia Corporation, a New Orleans bank 
holding company, immediately after Hurricane Katrina.100 
Sandell “held a large long position in Hibernia.”101 The firm was 
apparently concerned that the natural disaster would decrease 
the offer price for Hibernia in a pending acquisition of the bank 
by another company.102 To protect Sandell against potential 
losses if the acquisition deal fell through, Sandell employees 
allegedly tried to short sell as many shares as possible to hedge 
its Hibernia investment and in the process, “short” sale orders 
were falsely marked as “long” sale orders.103 
Until its repeal in 2007, the uptick rule was in place as 
a backstop to regulate harmful or manipulative short selling in 
a declining market for nearly as long as the existence of the 
  
 97 Id. at 75,071. 
 98 Id. The SEC granted this exemption in large part due to the fact it was in 
the process of conducting a Pilot to study the effect of removing a short sale price test 
rule. Id.; see also infra Part III. The Commission did not want to jeopardize the quality 
of the pilot data or impose costs on the NASDAQ to implement a rule when it was 
possible the rule would be temporary. 2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO 
and Rule 10a-1, supra note 46, at 75,071. After the NASDAQ was accepted as a 
national exchange, the bid test was codified as NASD Rule 5100. At this time, the SEC 
also exempted NASDAQ securities, newly listed on a national exchange, from the bid 
test when traded on non-national exchanges. Id. 
 99 See Regulation of Short Sales, 17 C.F.R. § 242.200(g) (2007). If the sale of a 
stock was subject to a particular exemption from the uptick rule, the order was 
required to be marked “short exempt.” Id. § 242.200(g)(2). 
 100 Press Release 2007-216, SEC, SEC Charges New York Hedge Fund Adviser 
With Short Sale Violations in Connection With Hibernia-Capital One Merger (Oct. 10, 
2007), http://sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-216.htm. Sandell Asset Management settled 
with the SEC for approximately $8 million without admitting or denying the charges. Id.  
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
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SEC itself.104 However, as a result of market modernization and 
a growing list of exceptions to the rule, the SEC sought to 
revisit whether the rule needed to be modified to fit the trading 
practices of the twenty-first century.105 
III. THE REPEAL OF THE UPTICK RULE AND RENEWED 
CONSIDERATION OF A PRICE TEST RULE 
The uptick rule has been considered controversial for 
decades. During the seventy years the uptick rule was in effect, 
the SEC studied its efficacy and necessity on several occasions, 
but it made no significant changes to the rule until its repeal in 
2007. In addition to studying the effects of short selling on the 
market crash in fall 1938, another extensive study was 
performed in 1962.106 Between 1939 and 1963, the NYSE 
lobbied unsuccessfully for the SEC to change the price test rule 
and allow short sales of a security at any price, so long as that 
price was higher than the closing price of the security on the 
previous trading day.107 The necessity of this rule was examined 
again in 1976.108 Given the history of the uptick rule, it was no 
surprise that when the SEC issued a Concept Release in 1999 
in order to garner public comments on the short selling rules in 
an effort to “modernize” regulation of short selling, it received 
more than 2700 comment letters.109 
A. The 2007 Repeal of the Uptick Rule 
The SEC felt it was necessary to re-examine the short 
selling rules due to several market developments, including the 
  
 104 Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 48,709, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,972, 62,972 
(Nov. 6, 2003). 
 105 See id. at 62,973. 
 106 Short Sales of Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 13,091, supra note 87, 
at 56,534. The Special Study, published in 1963, was more extensive than the 1937 
study and concluded that while short sales as a percentage of total market volume 
increased in a declining market, the tick rule should be accompanied by a rule to “cope” 
with short selling during market declines because plus and zero plus ticks could occur 
in “sharply declining markets.” Id. 
 107 The uptick rule only applied to transactions on national exchanges 
regulated by the SEC (such as the New York Stock Exchange) and to securities traded 
on national exchanges. Thus the rule did not apply to over the counter (OTC) sales of 
securities that are not traded on an exchange. See David C. Worley, The Regulation of 
Short Sales: The Long and Short of It, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1255, 1261 (1990).  
 108 Short Sales of Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 13,091, supra note 87, 
at 56,530.  
 109 Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 48,709, supra note 104, at 62,973. 
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increase in NASDAQ-listed securities trading off that market, 
the impact of electronic trading and decimalization, and the 
effect of the now-commonplace practice of trading of options.110 
There was also speculation that hedge funds heavily pressured 
the SEC to re-evaluate the short selling regulations.111 
In 2003, after receiving and examining comments on its 
1999 Concept Release, the SEC submitted Regulation SHO for 
public consideration.112 Rather than rescind the uptick rule 
immediately, Regulation SHO proposed a pilot test period (the 
“Pilot”) during which time the uptick rule would be 
inapplicable to certain stocks.113 This would allow the SEC to 
obtain and study information about the trading activity for 
stocks not subject to a short sale price test.114 After an initial 
delay, the Pilot began in May 2005.115 Although the test was 
supposed to end in April 2006, the SEC extended the Pilot until 
August 2007 to give the Commission enough time to evaluate 
the data and determine whether to modify or repeal the price 
test rules in place.116 The Pilot exempted approximately 1000 
stocks, chosen from the Russell 3000 Index, from the uptick 
rule.117 The SEC selected the Pilot stocks using a methodology 
that it felt would “giv[e] due consideration to the liquidity, 
volatility, market depth and trading market of these 
securities.”118  
  
 110 See id. 
 111 See Jeff Benjamin, Did Repeal of the Uptick Rule Unleash Market Havoc? 
Surge of Volatility, Rising Number of Short Sales Cited as Evidence, 11 INV. NEWS 3, 3 
(2007). 
 112 Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 48,709, supra note 104, at 62,973.  
 113 Id. at 62,983. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Order Extending Term of Short Sale Pilot, Exchange Act Release No. 
53,684, 71 Fed. Reg. 24,765, 24,765 (proposed Apr. 20, 2006).  
 116 Id. The primary reason for the extension was to prevent securities markets 
from having to make costly modifications to their systems and procedures more than 
once in the event the Commission decided to repeal a short sale price test rule. Id. The 
end of the Pilot coincided with the expiration of the temporary order suspending price 
tests. Id. 
 117 Order Suspending the Operation of Short Sale Price Provisions, Exchange 
Act Release No. 50,104, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,032, 48,032 (proposed July 28, 2004). The 
Russell 3000 Index includes the largest 3000 U.S. companies and its composition is 
updated annually. Russell 3000 Index Fact Sheet, http://www.russell.com/Indexes/ 
characteristics_fact_sheets/us/Russell_3000_Index.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2009); see 
also OEA ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 80, at 23. 
 118 Order Suspending the Operation of Short Sale Price Provisions, 69 Fed. 
Reg. at 48,032. The securities included in the Pilot were chosen from the Russell 3000 
as of June 25, 2004 and the test group included only those stocks subject to Rule 10-
(a)(1), which were all those traded on the NASDAQ and those listed on the NYSE or 
American Stock Exchange (Amex). Id. The stocks were grouped by the three exchanges 
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Following the conclusion of the first year of the Pilot 
period, the SEC Office of Economic Analysis (“OEA”) analyzed 
the Pilot data and issued a report in early 2007 to assist the 
Commission in deciding whether to repeal the price test rule, to 
install an alternative price test, or to retain the price test 
already in place.119 Based on the results of the OEA’s analysis, a 
public roundtable discussing the OEA report, and four 
additional studies performed by independent parties, the SEC 
concluded that “[g]enerally, the Pilot Results supported 
removal of current price test restrictions.”120 The Pilot data 
revealed little relationship between “manipulative short 
selling” and the restrictions imposed by the uptick rule.121 
Another factor that contributed to the SEC’s decision to 
reconsider and eventually repeal the uptick rule was the 
Commission’s goal of creating a “more consistent regulatory 
environment for short selling.”122 During the nearly seventy 
years the uptick rule was in effect, the SEC granted numerous 
exceptions to the rule, primarily as a result of the 
modernization of the markets and the evolution of trading 
practices.123 Generally, the SEC allowed statutory or written 
exemptions for types of transactions that the uptick rule was 
not designed to prevent or for activities that were not deemed 
abusive.124 For example, a statutory exception to the uptick rule 
was granted for exchange-traded funds, and another was 
  
and then ranked by “average daily dollar volume” during the preceding year. Id. Every 
third stock (beginning with the second stock on the list), was then chosen in order to 
have “a more representative daily dollar volume sample.” Id at 48,032, n.7. 50% of the 
test stocks were listed on NYSE, 2.2% on the Amex, and 47.8% on the NNM. Id. at 
48,032. The approximately 2000 stocks in the index not chosen for the Pilot constituted 
the control group and the percentage distribution across the three exchanges were 
nearly identical. Id. 
 119 See Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1 Final Rule Release, supra note 9, at 
36,349, n.17. 
 120 Id. at 36,349. See generally OEA ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 80. 
Though much of the economic analysis in this report is beyond the legal scope of this 
Note, the conclusions of the report that the SEC utilized in determining to rescind the 
uptick rule will be discussed in this Part and infra Part V. 
 121 2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra 
note 46, at 75,073. 
 122 Id. at 75,068. 
 123 Id. at 75,071. The statutory exceptions to the uptick rule can be found in 
section e of Rule 10a-1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1(e)(1)-(12) (2007). The SEC may also 
exempt transactions from the uptick rule upon “written request.” See 17. C.F.R. 
§ 240.10a-1(f) (“This rule shall not prohibit any transaction or transaction which the 
Commission, upon written request or upon its own motion, exempts, either 
unconditionally or on specified terms and conditions.”). 
 124 Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 42,037, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,996, 57,997-
98 (Oct. 28, 1999). 
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granted to allow market makers and specialists to sell short on 
a zero minus tick, to ensure maintenance of prices and market 
liquidity.125 In addition to these exceptions, in 2000-2001, U.S. 
securities markets implemented decimalization, which changed 
the pricing of shares from 1/16th minimum increments to $.01 
increments.126 In a decimalized trading environment, one tick of 
a stock price now had a value of $.01 as compared to the old 
minimum tick of 1/16th of one dollar, or $.0625. In repealing the 
rule, the SEC and other critics of the uptick rule argued that 
decimalization made the rule less effective since a penny tick 
test would be less effective at slowing down short sellers.127  
The SEC also felt repealing the uptick rule was 
necessary to prevent exchange arbitrage. This is because 
regulatory differences between exchanges could put exchanges 
with a price test rule at a competitive disadvantage to 
exchanges without such a rule.128 For example, in 1985, the 
NYSE publicized that it wanted the price test rule relaxed in 
order to combat competition from the London Stock Exchange, 
an exchange without a short sale price test.129 As financial 
markets have continued to globalize over the past twenty 
years, this competition still exists. The results of the Pilot lent 
support to these concerns, as it indicated that short selling as a 
portion of total volume increased by 2% in the absence of price 
test restrictions.130 The Commission construed this data to 
mean that investors could be more inclined to conduct their 
short sale transactions at market centers without short sale 
price tests.131  
  
 125 2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra 
note 46, at 75,072. 
 126 See Testimony Concerning the Effects of Decimalization on the Securities 
Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. and Investment Comm. on Banking, 
Hous. and Urban Aff., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Laura S. Unger, Acting Chair, 
U.S. SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/052401tslu.htm. 
 127 See April 2009 Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 4, at 18,061 
(“[T]he Commission noted [at the time of repeal of the uptick rule] that decimal 
increments had resulted in a rule that was no longer suited to the wide variety of 
trading strategies and systems used in the marketplace.”). 
 128 2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra 
note 46, at 75,075. 
 129 Macey et al., supra note 27, at 804.  
 130 OEA PILOT STUDY, supra note 80, at 35. 
 131 2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra 
note 46, at 75,075; see also OEA PILOT STUDY, supra note 80, at 35-36. 
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Whether hedge funds influenced the SEC’s decision to 
remove price test restrictions on short selling is debatable.132 
But the timing of the Pilot test and the repeal of the uptick rule 
certainly coincided with the ascension of hedge funds.133 While 
there is no agreed-upon, clear-cut definition of a hedge fund,134 
managers of these private investment funds often rely heavily 
on short selling as an investment strategy.135 Traditional 
investment companies, which are regulated by the Investment 
Company Act,136 are subject to stringent rules requiring 
extensive disclosure of short sales in the companies’ investor 
prospectuses and annual reports.137 Because hedge funds are 
not subject to the same regulation, the growth of hedge funds 
likely increased the visibility and incidence of short selling 
since they may freely use short selling strategies to maximize 
returns.138 Predictably, hedge funds were publicly supportive of 
both the SEC’s initial 2003 proposal suggesting the Pilot 
study,139 and the 2006 proposal to repeal the uptick rule.140 
  
 132 See Benjamin, supra note 111, at 3; Editorial, Opposing Uptick Rule is 
Truly Short-Sighted, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Oct. 16, 2008, at A10. 
 133 Hedge fund employees are famously secretive about their investments and 
strategies, partly due to the competitive nature of the industry and partly because they 
raise funds privately, without advertising or public solicitation. Jenny Anderson, Hedge 
Funds Walk a Hard Line Between Silence and Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at 
C7. Private fundraising means that hedge funds fall outside the scope of the Securities 
Act of 1933. Id. This secrecy and the fact that there are no public reporting 
requirements make it difficult to estimate the precise increase in the amount of assets 
under management by hedge funds. However, for the sake of perspective, one estimate 
approximates that the number of global assets under management in hedge funds 
increased from “$50 billion in 1990 to approximately $1 trillion at the end of 2004.” 
Burton G. Malkiel & Atanu Saha, Hedge Funds: Risk and Return, 61 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 
80, 80 (2005). In 2003, the “significant growth” of hedge funds prompted the SEC to 
compile a report to study implications of this growth given the “lack of information” 
available about hedge funds. SEC, STAFF REPORT TO THE SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, 
IMPLICATION OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS vii (2003), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf. 
 134 In a 2003 Staff Report, the SEC provided its general definition, calling a 
hedge fund “an entity that holds a pool of securities and perhaps other assets, whose 
interests are not sold in a registered public offering and which is not registered as an 
investment company under the Investment Company Act.” SEC, STAFF REPORT TO THE 
SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 133, at 3.  
 135 See id. at 5. 
 136 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006). 
 137 SEC, STAFF REPORT TO THE SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 133, at 43, 
n.147. 
 138 Id. at 42-43. 
 139 See Letter from John G. Gaine, President, Managed Funds Assoc., to 
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 26, 2004) (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
s72303/managedfunds012604.htm). On behalf of the Managed Funds Association, an 
organization which represents an industry group of alternative investment fund 
professionals (including those employed by some of the largest hedge funds), Mr. Gaine 
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However, despite initially strongly supporting the SEC’s 
decision to repeal the uptick rule, some hedge funds lobbied for 
the reinstatement of the rule once the SEC imposed the 
emergency ban on short sales in September 2008.141 These calls 
by hedge funds to reinstate the uptick rule came fast and 
furious after the SEC banned short sales and began requiring 
funds to disclose short positions.142 This outcry over the 
disclosure requirement was part of the reason the SEC 
softened its stance and modified the regulations slightly so that 
only short positions in excess of a fair market value of $10 
million had to be reported (as opposed to the initial 
requirement of $1 million).143  
In 2006, the SEC announced a proposal to repeal the 
uptick rule and solicited another round of public comments, 
most of which were in favor of the rule change.144 The comments 
submitted were mostly in line with the SEC’s view expressed in 
the proposal, pointing out that improvement in market 
surveillance and transparency rendered the backstop of a price 
test rule unnecessary.145 The comments asserted that the 
elimination of price test restrictions would allow the market to 
benefit from the merits of short selling, such as pricing 
efficiency and liquidity, while eliminating investors’ 
operational costs directly associated with compliance with the 
rule.146 Interestingly, two individual investors urged the SEC to 
keep the uptick rule in place to prevent bear raids.147 Another 
comment letter from a finance professor agreed vigorously with 
the SEC’s decision, but also made an interesting point that 
perhaps if more short sale data were publicly available, shorts 
  
“encourage[d] the Commission to . . . move expeditiously toward the complete removal 
of short sale price regulation.” Id.  
 140 See Letter from John G. Gaine, President, Managed Funds Assoc., to 
Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Feb. 12, 2007) (http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-
06/s72106-31.pdf) (urging the SEC to repeal all price test restrictions and applauding 
its efforts “towards removing obsolete and unnecessary regulations”). 
 141 See Anuj Gangahar & Joann Chung, Funds Want ‘Uptick’ Rule Back, FIN. 
TIMES.COM, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0362e760-8b24-11dd-b634-
0000779fd18c,s01=1.html; Healy & Kerber, supra note 65. 
 142 See Healy & Kerber, supra note 65. 
 143 See Disclosure of Short Sales and Short Positions By Institutional 
Investment Managers, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 58,785, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,678, 
61,680 (Oct. 17, 2008). 
 144 Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1 Final Rule Release, supra note 9, at 
36,350. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id.  
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would not always be the first parties blamed during market 
declines.148 
One comment letter the NYSE submitted following the 
announcement of the proposal to repeal the uptick rule was 
particularly notable. The NYSE expressed concern that the 
entire Pilot test took place during a period in which the market 
was relatively stable.149 As such, the NYSE noted that removal 
of the rule during a period of “unusually rapid and large 
market decline” could not be measured.150 Conversely, when the 
SEC established the rule in 1938, it did so in part based on a 
study of two one week periods in September and October of 
1938 that were “characterized by a large volume of trading, 
erratic intermediate price movements and intensive 
liquidation.”151 The NYSE also expressed its belief that national 
exchanges should have the option to suggest price-testing rules 
in unstable markets.152 Not surprisingly, immediately following 
the SEC’s ban on short selling of financial stocks in 2008, the 
Chief Executive of the NYSE, Duncan Niederauer, publicly 
announced that he favored the return of the uptick rule, 
especially in volatile market conditions.153  
B. The SEC’s Reconsideration of the Uptick Rule 
Following the financial upheaval in 2008 and the 
appointment and confirmation of a new SEC Chairman in 
2009, revisiting the regulation of short selling was an 
immediate priority for the SEC, due to the “extreme market 
conditions” and “deterioration in investor confidence.”154 In 
April 2009, the SEC sought comment on its proposal of two 
different approaches to regulate short selling.155 The extensive 
  
 148 Letter from James J. Angel, Assoc. Prof. of Fin., Georgetown Univ., to 
Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, S.E.C (Feb. 14, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-
06/s72106-35.pdf. 
 149 See Letter from Mary Yeager, Assistant Sec’y, N.Y. Stock Exch., to Nancy 
M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Feb. 14, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-06/s72106-
34.pdf. 
 150 Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1 Final Rule Release, supra note 9, at 
36,350; see also Letter from Mary Yeager, Assistant Sec’y, N.Y. Stock Exch., to Nancy 
M. Morris, supra note 149. 
 151 Exchange Act Release No. 1548, 1938 WL 32911, supra note 82, at *1. 
 152 Letter from Mary Yeager, Assistant Sec’y, N.Y. Stock Exch., to Nancy M. 
Morris, supra note 149. 
 153 Geoffrey Rogow, NYSE Chief Leans Toward Uptick Rule, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
2, 2008, at C5.  
 154 April 2009 Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 4, at 18,043. 
 155 See id. at 18,042. 
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proposal detailed the approaches and included nearly two 
hundred questions for commenters to consider related to the 
proposed rules when providing feedback.156 The SEC received 
approximately four thousand comment letters regarding these 
proposals.157 Predictably, there was a wide range of responses, 
with many institutional commenters expressing concern that a 
short sale price test would have a deleterious effect on the 
efficiency and liquidity of the market,158 and many others 
urging the reinstatement of a price test regulation.159 This 
volume of responses helped prompt the announcement of a 
second public comment period in August 2009, proposing an 
additional version of a price test rule.160 In connection with the 
proposed rule releases, the SEC held a roundtable to discuss 
short sale price test regulation in May 2009 with various 
industry professionals.161  
The SEC suggested two different regulatory schemes in 
April 2009, the market-wide approach, with a permanent rule 
regulating short selling, and the circuit breaker approach that 
would implement a short selling regulation once the price of a 
security dropped precipitously, and could operate in 
conjunction with a market-wide or price test rule, or stand 
alone.162 As to the market-wide approach, the SEC solicited 
comments on two different price test rules, the “proposed 
uptick rule,” similar to the repealed Rule 10a-1 and the 
“proposed modified uptick rule,” similar to the bid test used by 
  
 156 See generally id. 
 157 Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No, 34-60,509, 74 
Fed. Reg. 42,033, 42,033 (Aug. 20, 2009) [hereinafter August 2009 Amendments to 
Regulation SHO]. 
 158 See, e.g., Letter from Richard Chase, Managing Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Royal 
Bank of Can. Capital Markets Corp., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Sept. 21, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-09/s70809-4665.pdf; Letter from Paul 
M. Russo, Managing Dir., Head of U.S. Equity Trading, Goldman, Sachs & Co., to 
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (June 19, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-08-09/s70809-3809.pdf.  
 159 See, e.g., Letter from Edward D. Herlihy and Theodore A. Levine, Wachtell, 
Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (June 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-09/s70809-3690.pdf; E-mail from Glen Shipway to 
SEC, (June, 19, 2009) (http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-09/s70809-3795.pdf). 
 160 August 2009 Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 157, at 42,033. 
 161 See generally SEC, Roundtable to Discuss Short Sale Price Tests and Short 
Sale Circuit Breakers, May 5, 2009, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/shortsales/round 
table050509/shortsalesroundtable050509-transcript.pdf. Roundtable participants 
included bankers, traders, regulators, economists, lawyers, and academics. SEC, 
Panelists’ Biographies, Roundtable to Discuss Short Sale Price Tests and Short Sale 
Circuit Breakers, May 5, 2009, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/shortsales/roundtable 
050509/bios.htm.  
 162 April 2009 Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 4, at 18,043. 
1472 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:4 
NASDAQ before it became a national exchange.163 The 
Commission also suggested two alternative rules for the circuit 
breaker approach.164 The first is a “proposed circuit breaker halt 
rule” that would be “triggered by a severe price decline” in a 
stock and prohibit any short selling of that security.165 The 
second is a “circuit breaker price test rule[]” that would take 
effect when the price of a stock declined, while still allowing 
investors to short sell the security.166 Additionally, two 
alternative circuit breaker price test rules, the “proposed 
circuit breaker uptick rule” and the “proposed circuit breaker 
modified uptick rule,” were also suggested, paralleling the price 
test rules discussed under the market-wide approach.167 The 
SEC also discussed an “alternative uptick rule” in April 2009, 
but did not seek formal comment on this proposed regulation 
until August 2009.168 The alternative uptick rule is a price test 
rule that could be utilized in either a market-wide approach or 
a circuit breaker approach and would allow short selling of a 
stock only “at a price above the current national best bid.”169  
Before determining how to act, the SEC stated that it 
would also evaluate empirical data as it became available.170 
The OEA had provided the Commission some preliminary data 
analyzing how a short sale price test would have affected the 
markets and whether short selling created downward pressure 
on stock prices during September 2008, at the height of the 
credit crisis.171 The SEC’s April 2009 proposal noted that the 
requests it received urging reinstatement of the uptick rule had 
not included any empirical data in support of these requests, 
but that it was “looking forward to receiving analysis of 
relevant data” related to the market effects of a price test rule, 
and the “costs and benefits of reinstating” some type of price 
test or circuit breaker rule.172 
In late February 2010, the SEC announced that it voted 
to adopt an alternative uptick rule that would take effect if a 
  
 163 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also notes 88-89, 94-96 and 
accompanying text. 
 164 April 2009 Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 4, at 18,043. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 August 2009 Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 157, at 42,033. 
 169 Id. 
 170 See April 2009 Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 4, at 18,049. 
 171 See id. 
 172 Id. 
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stock traded down more than ten percent in a day.173 Once the 
ten percent decline threshold is reached, short selling may 
occur only at a price above the best bid.174 During both of the 
2009 comment periods, the SEC received a plethora of 
empirical data, but it did not point to any particular study that 
it found to be especially persuasive and conclusive when it 
implemented the new rule.175 This new regulation, Rule 201, 
will have broad coverage and “generally cover all securities . . . 
listed on a national exchange.”176 Once the price of a security 
declines 10%, the trading limits will continue in effect for the 
rest of the trading day as well as the following day.177 In 
enacting Rule 201, the SEC aims to regulate manipulative 
short selling and maintain investor confidence without 
“hav[ing] any negative effect on market liquidity and price 
efficiency.”178 
IV. REGULATION OF SHORT SELLING IN THE ABSENCE OF A 
PRICE TEST RULE 
Upon announcing its decision to repeal the uptick rule 
in 2007, the SEC made sure to point to other statutes and 
regulations that enable the agency to police abusive short 
selling practices in the absence of a price test rule.179 Even 
without the uptick rule, it is still illegal to short sell stocks in 
contravention of the other securities rules and regulations.180 
These statutes and rules were likewise enacted to protect 
investors and to maintain stable markets, and are the same 
regulations the agency would have used to enforce price 
manipulation and fraud through short selling even if the uptick 
rule were in place.  
  
 173 See Floyd Norris, S.E.C. Restricts Short-Selling and Addresses a Global 
Accounting Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2010, at B3. 
 174 See id; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 175 2010 Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 21, at 11,241-44. 
 176 Id. at 11,245. Options are not covered by Rule 201. Id. 
 177 Id. at 11,244. 
 178 Id. at 11,248. 
 179 2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra 
note 46, at 75,069 n.16. In addition to the laws discussed in this Part, the SEC also 
regulates short sales in connection with public securities offerings in Regulation M, 
Rule 105. Regulation M, 17 C.F.R. § 242.105 (2009). Public offerings have specific 
regulations that differ from rules that govern day-to-day trading activities. See 
Regulation M, 17 C.F.R. § 242.100-105 (2009).  
 180 See supra note 78.  
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The Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) section 
17(a) is an anti-fraud provision that prohibits the use of 
interstate commerce to effect “fraud or deceit” through the sale 
of securities. 181 A violation of subsection (a)(1) of this provision 
requires scienter.182 The Exchange Act also has two provisions 
that can be utilized to regulate abusive short selling. The first, 
section 9(a), prohibits the manipulation of securities prices, 
although this section applies only to securities listed on an 
exchange.183 The second provision, section 10(b), prohibits the 
use of any “manipulative or deceptive device[s]” in connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities and applies to any 
security, whether exchange-listed or not.184 Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act is extremely important in SEC enforcement 
because it is the general “catch-all” regulation that the SEC 
uses to implement needed rules to protect the investing 
public.185 The SEC enforces section 10(b) through Rule 10b-5.186 
The activities proscribed under Rule 10b-5 are similar to those 
proscribed under section 17(a) of the Securities Act, but Rule 
10b-5 is the farthest reaching anti-fraud rule promulgated by 
the Exchange Act, since it applies to any security.187 
Section 9(a) of the Exchange Act is the most important 
provision prohibiting price manipulation of securities listed on 
a national exchange.188 Since the securities of the largest and 
most frequently-traded companies are listed on national 
exchanges like the NYSE and the NASDAQ, this provision has 
bite. Several subsections of section 9(a) can be applied to 
manipulative short selling.189 The primary anti-manipulation 
  
 181 Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006). 
 182 See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980). 
 183 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2000). 
 184 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
 185 Joseph I. Goldstein et al., An Overview of Market Manipulation: Legal and 
Practical Aspects, in SECOND ANNUAL MARKET MANIPULATION 99, 105 (Joseph I. 
Goldstein et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter An Overview of Market Manipulation] 
(“[§ 10(b)] is a broad ‘catch-all’ provision that empowers the Commission to prescribe 
rules that it deems necessary and appropriate to protect investors and the public 
interest.” (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976))). 
 186 Id. at 105. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 103. 
 189 Section 9(a)(1) primarily applies to “wash sales” and “matched orders.” Id. 
at 104. A wash sale is a transaction “which involves no change in the beneficial 
ownership” of a security. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78i(a)(1)(A) (2006). A matched order occurs when a purchaser (or seller) of a security 
enters an order for the purchase (or sale) of that security, when he knows that another 
party will be ordering a sale (or purchase) in the same security “at substantially the 
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provision is subsection 9(a)(2).190 To establish a violation of this 
provision, the SEC or the plaintiff191 must establish that: 1) a 
person made “a series of transactions in any security”; 2) that 
those transactions resulted either “in actual or apparent active 
trading in such security” or in a rise or decline in the price of 
such security; and 3) that the transactions were made “for the 
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by 
others.”192 Section 9(a)(2) also requires the plaintiff to establish 
manipulative intent.193 A would-be violation of section 9(a)(2) 
that is effected with a security not listed on an exchange is a 
violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Act.194  
Other provisions of section 9(a) that are relevant to the 
regulation of short selling include subsections 9(a)(3) and 
9(a)(4), both of which apply to broker-dealers, as well as anyone 
else trading (purchasing or selling) stocks.195 Subsection 9(a)(3) 
prohibits any trader of a listed security from “inducing the 
purchase or sale” of a security by “circulating or disseminating 
information that market activity may occur that will cause the 
security’s price to rise or fall.”196 Subsection 9(a)(4) prohibits 
  
same size, at substantially the same time, and at substantially the same price.” Id. 
§ 9(a)(1)(B). 
 190 Manipulation of securities prices is a “term of art” that is defined in 
different ways. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (“[Manipulation] 
connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by 
controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities.” (citation omitted)); see also In 
re Pagel, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 22,280, 33 SEC Docket 1003, 1985 WL 
548387, at *3 (1985) (“In essence, a manipulation is intentional interference with the 
free forces of supply and demand.” (citation omitted)). 
 191 There is a statutorily provided private cause of action for any person who 
“purchase[s] or sell[s] any security” that was “affected by [an] act or transaction” in 
violation of Exchange Act § 9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) 
(2006).  
 192 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2006). A 
plaintiff in a private cause of action would also be required to prove that he relied on 
the transactions in question and that the transactions affected the plaintiff’s purchase 
or selling price. See Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, 682 F.2d 1149, 1164 (5th Cir. 
1982), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983). 
 193 In re Sharon M. Graham, Initial Decision Release No. 82, 1995 SEC Lexis 
3457, at *26 (Dec. 28, 1995) (“Section[] . . . 9(a)(2) require[s] that the proscribed 
activities be engaged in with the requisite manipulative intent.”). 
 194 SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (“It is 
well settled that the manipulative activities expressly prohibited by § 9(a)(2) of the 
Exchange Act with respect to a listed security are also violations of § 17(a) of the 
Securities Act and § 10(b) of the Exchange Act when the same activities are conducted 
with respect to an over-the-counter security.”). For background on over-the-counter 
securities, see supra note 93. 
 195 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a)(3)-(4), 15 § U.S.C. 78i(a)(3)-(4) 
(2006). 
 196 An Overview of Market Manipulation, supra note 185, at 104; see also 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(3) (2006). 
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buyers and sellers of listed securities from making “false or 
misleading” statements regarding any material fact related to 
a security to encourage a purchase or sale of that security, 
when the buyer or seller “had reasonable ground to believe” 
such statement to be “false or misleading.”197  
Section 10(b), the main anti-fraud provision of the 
Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, are 
commonly used enforcement tools.198 Section 10(b) prohibits any 
person, by any means, from the “use . . . in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security . . . [of] any manipulative or 
deceptive device.”199 Further, Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful to 
use “any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” to make 
material omissions or misrepresentations, or to engage in a 
fraudulent act “in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.”200 Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not require that a 
security transaction in question be effected on a national 
exchange, but they do require proof of scienter.201 Negligence 
has not been held sufficient to establish scienter under Rule 
10b-5, but courts have held that proof of recklessness is 
adequate to establish a cause of action.202 
In addition to the general securities laws that the SEC 
can utilize to regulate short selling, the SEC has also made 
permanent Rule 204T, which was initially adopted as a 
temporary measure in October 2008.203 Rule 204 now imposes a 
borrowing delivery requirement to try to reduce “potentially 
abusive ‘naked’ short selling.”204 This rule requires market 
participants who fail to deliver securities at settlements to 
close out the position (by borrowing or purchasing securities) 
  
 197 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a)(4), § 15 U.S.C. 78i(a)(4) (2006). 
 198 Rule 10b-5 is used so commonly because it is also the rule by which the 
SEC enforces violations of insider trading. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-20 
(2002); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 847-50 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). 
 199 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 200 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).  
 201 See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980). (“[S]cienter is an element of a 
violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the 
nature of the relief sought.”).  
 202 Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(“[R]eckless conduct may be defined as . . . involving not merely simple, or even 
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, 
and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the 
defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.” (quoting Franke 
v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976))). 
 203 See July 2009 Final Rule Release — Rule 204, supra note 29, at 38,266. 
 204 Id. 
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by the start of the trading day following the settlement date.205 
If the failure to deliver is not timely closed out, then the 
participant 
may not accept a short sale order in the equity security from 
another person, or effect a short sale in the equity security 
for its own account, to the extent that the broker or dealer 
submits its short sales to that participant for clearance and 
settlement, without first borrowing the security, or entering 
into a bona fide arrangement to borrow the security, until 
the participant closes out the fail to deliver position by 
purchasing securities of like kind and quantity and that 
purchase has cleared and settled at a registered clearing 
agency.206 
This rule is particularly designed to address potentially 
abusive naked short selling, which can also affect investor 
confidence and create “unwarranted reputational damage.”207 
The SEC clearly has a variety of enforcement provisions 
available to address fraud or price manipulation through short 
selling, but these rules all require targeted enforcement, while 
a price test rule theoretically provides a general backstop for 
abusive practices without requiring the SEC to prove 
intentional conduct or targeted manipulative action toward a 
specific security. 
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF A PRICE TEST RULE IN TODAY’S 
MARKETS 
At the time the uptick rule was repealed in 2007, the 
SEC felt that short selling regulation could be scaled back 
because of the “high levels of transparency and regulatory 
surveillance” in modern markets.208 The Commissioners felt 
that the “abusive or manipulative” short selling the uptick rule 
was designed to curb was less likely to occur in what the 
agency felt to be a highly-regulated environment.209 However, 
during the eighteen months following the removal of the uptick 
rule, a series of events occurred, indicating that modern U.S. 
markets were neither transparent nor well-regulated. The 
federal government was required to bail out the United States 
  
 205 Id. at 38,292. 
 206 Id. at 38,292 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 242.204(b)). 
 207 Id. at 38,267-68. 
 208 2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra 
note 46, at 75,069. 
 209 Id. 
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banking system due to toxic securities that threatened 
liquidity; one major investment bank was sold at a fire-sale 
price to avoid collapse, while another investment bank holding 
company filed for Chapter 11; and the federal government was 
forced to take an equity stake in the world’s largest insurance 
company as a result of the company’s liabilities for credit 
default swaps.210 The proverbial icing on the cake was the 
discovery of a massive Ponzi-style fraud scheme costing 
investors untold billions of dollars and perpetrated by a well-
known financier.211 While these incidents were unrelated to 
short selling per se, and despite the many securities 
regulations in place, modern markets appeared to be far less 
transparent than posited when deciding to repeal the uptick 
rule.  
A. Why Regulation in the Absence of a Price Test Rule Is 
Insufficient 
The fact that the SEC relied on its assumption of 
transparent and well-regulated markets when it repealed the 
uptick rule is troublesome. The SEC performed the Pilot and 
reviewed several academic studies based on the Pilot before 
repealing the uptick rule, all of which indicated that repeal of 
the rule would not affect investors and the market.212 However, 
after the markets proved to be inadequately regulated in 2008, 
the SEC was tasked with reevaluating the uptick rule or 
  
 210 See Ellen Simon, Business Year in Review: At Least You’ve Got Your 
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other investment funds and similar Ponzi schemes have been uncovered. David Glovin 
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Jan. 27, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid 
=a64niaXczcys&refer=home.  
 212 2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra 
note 46, at 75,069. 
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coming up with another type of price test regulation to police 
manipulative or fraudulent short selling and to preserve 
investor confidence in a volatile market. 
1. Importance of Investor Protection 
After various corporations, hedge funds, and individual 
401(k)s were wiped out in 2008, there was a call for the SEC to 
get back to basics by focusing on investor protection.213 
Reinstating a price test rule for short selling is one way for the 
SEC to enhance investor protection. A major underlying goal of 
all federal securities laws is to protect investors by preventing 
price manipulation in securities markets.214 In its Proposed 
Rule Release discussing the results of the Pilot, the SEC noted 
that while “there is concern regarding the possibility of 
manipulation using short sales,” the Pilot report did not note 
any increases in this practice during the Pilot period.215 
However, the Pilot report claims that the analysis it performed 
was not designed to directly examine whether instances of 
market manipulation through short selling occurred during the 
Pilot.216 The OEA also noted that there was a possibility that 
“traders with manipulative intentions” may have been more 
reluctant to act during the Pilot because of the additional layer 
of analysis of the trades due to the Pilot. 
In spite of this possibility, one of the major reasons the 
SEC felt comfortable removing the uptick rule was the 
availability of the “general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation 
  
 213 See Charles R. Schwab, Restore the Uptick Rule, Restore Confidence, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 9, 2008, at A17. 
 214 See, e.g., Trading Practices Rules Concerning Securities Offerings, 
Securities Act Release No. 7282, Exchange Act Release No. 37,094, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,108, 
17,108 (Apr. 18, 1996). This SEC proposed rule release stated: 
A fundamental goal of the federal securities laws is the prevention of 
manipulation. Manipulation impedes the securities markets from functioning 
as an independent pricing mechanism, and undermines the integrity and 
fairness of those markets. Congress granted broad rulemaking authority to 
the Commission to combat manipulative abuses in whatever form they might 
take, including anti-fraud, prophylactic, and general rulemaking authority. 
Id. 
 215 2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra 
note 46, at 75,069, n.16. 
 216 OEA PILOT STUDY, supra note 80, at 47-48 (“The type of analysis conducted 
in this study cannot directly prove whether market participants are engaging in 
manipulative practices, because it is inherently difficult to measure whether the Pilot 
has had any impact on the degree to which markets are susceptible to manipulation.”). 
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provisions”217 under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act 
that allow the agency to enforce fraud or price manipulation 
effected through short selling.218 While the SEC can utilize 
these statutes and rules to prevent manipulation and fraud in 
the absence of a price test rule for short selling, these 
regulations have several elements that must be established in 
order for the SEC to prove that fraud or manipulation related 
to short selling actually occurred.219 Proving fraud or 
manipulation can be particularly problematic when delineating 
whether or not information is a rumor. Trading and investment 
decisions on Wall Street are based partially on research and 
partially on instinct and opinions. At times, opinions may also 
be nothing more than thinly-veiled rumors. The difficulty in 
regulating the spread of rumors is especially obvious today, 
when the sheer number of communication methods available 
allows rumors to spread like wildfire. Regulating the flow of 
information in the market is a mammoth task. Thus, a 
permanent backstop to prevent manipulative short selling 
would supplement the other securities regulations and give 
investors, companies, and markets as a whole consistent 
protection.  
2. Whispers on the Street—the Rumor Problem 
The difficulty of regulating rumors in the markets has 
been acknowledged by the SEC. Testifying before the Senate 
Banking Committee in July 2008, then-SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox admitted that the SEC did not historically 
bring enforcement action against those spreading false rumors 
about a stock because of the complexities involved in 
determining who originated a false rumor and whether that 
originator knew that the information he or she spread was 
false.220 During this testimony, Mr. Cox also pointed to the 
Commission’s April 2008 lawsuit against a trader as a prime 
example of the SEC’s new attempts to enforce the spread of 
false rumors.221 In April 2008, the SEC filed a suit against Paul 
  
 217 2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra 
note 46, at 75,075. 
 218 Id. 
 219 See supra Part IV. 
 220 SEC, Testimony Concerning Recent Developments in U.S. Financial 
Markets and Regulatory Responses by Christopher Cox, Chairman, July 15, 2008, 
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2010] THE SHORT-CHANGING OF INVESTORS 1481 
S. Berliner, a trader, for allegedly spreading a false rumor 
about a pending acquisition transaction and charged him with 
securities fraud and market manipulation.222 In the case, the 
SEC used records of electronic communications, specifically 
instant messages, to obtain evidence of the fraud and 
manipulations.223 The complaint in this matter alleges that the 
trader spread rumors about the pending acquisition of Alliance 
Data Systems Corp. (“ADS”) by the Blackstone Group.224 ADS 
had agreed to sell its shares to Blackstone for $81.75 per 
share.225 The SEC alleged that the trader sent instant messages 
to thirty-one investment professionals claiming Blackstone 
amended its per-share offer and would now offer only $70.00 
per share for ADS’s stock.226 The media eventually picked up on 
this rumor and further disseminated the alleged 
misinformation.227 To illustrate the incredible swiftness with 
which a rumor can spread through the modern financial world, 
the stock price of ADS dropped seventeen percent in the thirty 
minutes after the trader sent the first instant message.228 Later 
the same day, the NYSE put temporary curbs on trading in 
ADS stock, and ADS was forced to issue a press release 
denying the rumor.229 Concurrently with sending instant 
messages, the trader also began to short sell 10,000 shares of 
ADS stock, for a profit of $25,509.230  
This case was eventually settled,231 but is notable for 
several reasons. First, the availability of electronic evidence in 
this case made the SEC’s task of proving who originated the 
rumor, whether or not the rumor was material information, 
  
 222 Complaint at 1-2, SEC v. Berliner, 08-CV-3859 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Apr. 
24, 2008). Mr. Berliner was charged with fraud under sections 17(a) of the Securities 
Act and 10(b) of the Exchanges Act (and Rule 10b-5 there under) and with market 
manipulation under section 9(a)(4) of the Exchange Act. Id. at 6-8. See SEC Litigation 
Release No. 20,537, Apr. 24, 2008, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/ 
lr20537.htm; see also supra Part IV for more information on these statutes. 
 223 Complaint, supra note 222, at 4.  
 224 Id. at 1. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. at 4. 
 227 Id. at 5. 
 228 Id. at 4. 
 229 Id. at 4-5. 
 230 Id. at 5-6. 
 231 The trader accused agreeing to settlement without admitting or denying 
wrongdoing. SEC Litigation Release No. 20,537, supra note 222. He had to pay back his 
illicit profits, pay a civil penalty of $130,000 and he was banned from “association with 
any broker or dealer.” Id. 
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and whether or not there was scienter232 far easier to prove than 
if the information in question was spread with an offhand 
comment made during a phone call or over a business lunch. 
This type of concrete evidence certainly will not be available in 
every case of short selling fraud or manipulation, which further 
hampers SEC enforcement attempts. Second, the trader in this 
case only made a profit of $25,509.233 While not negligible, this 
amount is far from remarkable. However, while making this 
nominal illicit profit of just $25,000, the trader caused the total 
market capitalization of ADS to decline by nearly $1.2 billion in 
just thirty minutes.234  
Reliable information is paramount to market 
confidence. The decline in the market capitalization of ADS 
stock related to the Berliner case illustrates how quickly 
markets can react and the devastating effect certain 
information can have on the price of a security.235 A price test 
rule to regulate short selling may help mitigate potential 
consequences of the spread of false information or merely 
unconfirmed information. Although short sellers provide a 
positive service by bringing securities prices close to 
equilibrium, harmful rumors, true or not, can wreak havoc and 
cause extreme volatility. ADS’s stock price recovered by the 
end of the trading day in question as a result of the company 
taking quick action to quash the rumor, but the fact remains 
that the information that drove down the stock price spread all 
over Wall Street in a matter of minutes.236  
When rumors persist over a longer period of time and 
are not blatantly fraudulent on their face or easily rebuttable 
  
 232 See supra Part IV. 
 233 See Kara Scannell & Gregory Zuckerman, SEC Accuses Ex-Trader of 
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by a company (like the rumor in the Berliner case), those 
rumors could potentially have a more devastating effect. One 
method of self-help against abusive short selling is for a 
company to repurchase its own stock, creating a short 
squeeze,237 and showing that the company has access to the 
capital markets.238 In fact, at least one commentator has blamed 
the SEC for preventing companies from protecting themselves 
from manipulative short sellers in this manner because of 
uncertainty about whether the companies themselves will be 
charged with illicit market manipulation.239 In cases of rumors 
spread over a protracted period, a price test on short selling 
could slow down the race to short a company’s stock, perhaps 
allowing a company a bit more time to deal with their financial 
issues in a more orderly fashion, ensuring compliance with all 
other SEC regulations and ultimately protecting investors.  
In the thick of the 2008 credit crisis, politicians and 
Wall Street executives speculated that protracted rumors were 
what killed Bear Stearns.240 On July 15, 2008, the SEC issued a 
warning that it would begin investigating these rumors to 
ensure that there was no fraud or collusion occurring to drive 
down Bear Stearns’s stock price.241 Similar concerns regarding 
rumors were voiced in regard to Lehman Brothers in the 
months before the bank collapsed.242 Since Wall Street “deals in 
rumors,”243 regulators have no easy task in proving that short 
sellers knowingly spread false information in order to profit. 
The SEC has maintained throughout the credit crisis that it 
was investigating accusations of fraud and price manipulation 
through short selling, but because some enforcement 
  
 237 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 238 Macey, The Government is Contributing to the Panic, supra note 61. 
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 241 See July 2008 Emergency Order, supra note 29, at 47,379. (“False rumors 
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N.Y. TIMES, June, 4, 2008. 
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investigations can take years, it will be some time before the 
findings of these investigations come to light.244  
B. The Uptick Rule as a Backstop 
Some critics of reinstating the short sale price test rule 
have pointed to the SEC’s recent implementation of Rule 204, 
regulating naked short sales, as another method to combat 
manipulation through short selling, rendering a price test rule 
unnecessary.245 While this rule will certainly reduce the number 
of “fails to deliver” and thus reduce the chances of 
manipulation through short selling, Rule 204 does not provide 
an overall backstop like a price test rule and thus would limit 
investor protection.246 
The uptick rule was also designed to prevent short 
selling from hastening a decreasing market so that even down 
markets would remain orderly.247 However, during the twelve 
month span of the Pilot, the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index 
increased nearly 12.8%,248 while the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average was up 10.9%.249 The Pilot study occurred when the 
market was increasing in an “orderly” fashion, but provided no 
data that the SEC could use to make an informed conclusion 
about the effect of the repeal of the uptick rule in volatile, 
declining markets, similar to those of the third and fourth 
quarters of 2008.250 The sharp increase in short selling that 
occurred at the height of the credit crisis in 2008 was exactly 
the scenario the NYSE warned of in its 2006 comment letter, 
even though it ultimately supported repeal of the rule.251 The 
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author of an independent empirical study using Pilot test data 
warned that the Pilot results only supported the SEC’s decision 
to repeal the uptick rule “conditionally, . . . the condition being 
the absence of extreme market conditions.”252 
It would be simplistic to blame the increase in short 
selling and market volatility following the repeal of the uptick 
rule on the removal of the rule alone; many factors contributed 
to the upheaval, creating a “perfect storm” of sorts.253 Some 
have said that they “doubt whether the continued existence of 
the short sale rule is justified, other than perhaps to provide 
investors with a semblance of confidence in the markets.”254 
However, the absence of the uptick rule or any other price test 
restriction or circuit breaker on short selling during a period of 
high market volatility and declining stock prices was seen by 
some as a factor in exacerbating this credit crisis.255 Even if the 
uptick rule is viewed as a mere prophylactic measure, allowing 
investors to retain some “semblance of confidence”256 in a falling 
market, this underlying confidence can be helpful in calming 
volatile markets and stabilizing cascading stock prices.  
The volatility and uncertainty in the market is what led 
the SEC to issue its September 2008 short sale ban. The 
temporary ban on short sales of financial stocks was thrown in 
place to prevent the collapse of more financial institutions and 
further liquidity issues. Despite the lip service paid to short 
sellers by the SEC about the positive benefits of short sales, 
such as preventing bubbles, properly valuing stock, and 
detecting corporate fraud, short sellers were among the first 
blamed during the financial crisis.257 One major complaint after 
the SEC announced this ban was whether financial stocks 
could be properly valued. For example, on September 15, 2008, 
the stock price of Washington Mutual closed at $2.00.258 When 
the short sell ban took effect on September 19, the stock price 
of the company, which was included on the banned list, closed 
at $4.25.259 On September 25, the share close price was $1.69,260 
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and that evening, the federal government seized the bank and 
sold its assets to JPMorgan Chase. From the date the short sell 
ban took effect until the day the bank failed, its stock price 
never dipped below $2.26261 per share, 13% above its value on 
September 15, the day that Lehman declared Chapter 11.262 On 
September 16, Washington Mutual issued a statement saying 
that it “shouldn’t be judged by its stock price,” and that the 
bank would not “go the way of Lehman Brothers” even though 
there were already rumors circulating that JPMorgan Chase 
was considering a merger.263  
In this case, the shorts were right about Washington 
Mutual, and it is conceivable that the short sale ban artificially 
prolonged the company’s life, but in light of the crisis 
surrounding the markets, this was not necessarily a negative 
result. Any breathing room provided by the short sale ban may 
have allowed the relatively orderly demise of Washington 
Mutual. In a market regulated by a short sale price test rule, 
the hope is that an extreme full-out ban on short sales would 
not be necessary to achieve this result. Ideally, a short sale 
price test rule would provide a backstop during troubled times, 
without impinging on beneficial short selling in an advancing 
market. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
After a period of market deregulation beginning in the 
mid-1990s, the financial crisis of 2008 devastated the American 
economy and resulted in an increase in support for more 
regulation of financial markets.264 The credit crisis of 2008 was 
certainly not caused by short sellers; bear raids and stock price 
manipulation were not what put the global economy on the 
precipice of collapse and the existence of the uptick rule during 
this period certainly would not have been a panacea to heal all 
market woes. Investors continued to lose confidence once the 
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global securities markets started cascading downward. In any 
case, the uptick rule or other price test backstop could have 
certainly helped instill some confidence in the stability of the 
markets. The fact that the uptick rule remained intact and 
unchanged since the advent of modern securities regulation 
until 2007 is remarkable, particularly considering that it was 
challenged and debated in so many instances.265 Perhaps a price 
test rule for short selling is merely a placebo to make investors 
feel better during tough times, but that does not mean the rule 
cannot be effective; it is difficult to argue that confidence in the 
securities markets is unimportant. 
The SEC’s dire decision to place an emergency ban on 
the short sale of securities of nearly 1000 companies in 
September 2008 points to the fact that either short selling was 
causing problems in a declining, nervous market environment 
or that there was a perception among market participants that 
this was the case. The decision to ban short selling of certain 
stocks is the sort of panicky and rash decision-making in a 
declining market that the uptick rule was designed to 
prevent.266 Depending on regulators to piece together a last-
minute ban in emergency situations in lieu of a permanent 
price test is an unwise decision. The SEC has powers to pass 
emergency orders when it sees fit, but waiting until a crisis 
occurs before taking regulatory action is not a wise practice, 
particularly if the action is too little or too late. Further, 
defining an emergency is not always simple.  
Finally, relying solely on fraud or anti-manipulation 
provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts to combat 
abusive short selling will be a losing proposition for the SEC, 
even with the addition of a rule to prevent naked short selling. 
The agency is already strapped for resources,267 but more salient 
is the fact that stock markets deal regularly with rumors and 
opinions. It is nearly impossible to stop whispers on the Street. 
The SEC has gone so far as touting its actions concerning the 
Berliner case on its website as a “landmark” action that shows 
the Commission was “[a]gressively [c]ombatting” market 
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manipulation during the credit crisis.268 If this one case, which 
ended in settlement, without adjudication, is a “landmark,” it 
seems that using enforcement actions as the only way to 
prevent market manipulation through short selling will likely 
prove to be very difficult and ultimately, ineffective.  
After considering several iterations of a short sale price 
test rule, the SEC settled on Rule 201, an alternative version of 
the original uptick rule to help protect investors and restore 
confidence. The implementation of Rule 201 should help 
prevent short sale manipulation, but some feel the rule does 
not go far enough.269 Moreover, the Rule is likely to be 
challenged by those who believe that regulation of short selling 
is market-restricting and comes at too high of an economic cost. 
It will thus remain to be seen if the new rule both proves 
effective in combating abusive short selling practices and 
achieves the same longevity as the original uptick rule. 
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